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DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
CRIMINAL LAW
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ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER**

This issue of the Marquette Law Review features papers presented at
the Marquette Law School Conference on Plea Bargaining on April 14,
2007. We organized the Conference to promote the development of an
interdisciplinary dialogue on plea bargaining between criminal law and
dispute resolution scholars. Our participants included distinguished
scholars in both fields, and readers of the following papers will soon
appreciate the wonderful depth and diversity of their insights into the
theory and practice of plea bargaining.
Although plea bargaining would seem a natural area for
collaboration and dialogue between students of criminal law and dispute
resolution, there has been remarkably little cross-fertilization between
the fields. This is unfortunate. For instance, scholars (and practitioners)
of criminal law may benefit from research in the dispute resolution area
on the psychological dynamics of negotiation,' the significance of
procedural justice,2 and the neurobiological aspects of negotiation.3 For
Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.
Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.
1. For instance, a colleague recently reported to one of us that, in a roomful of public
defenders from around the country, not one reported having ever even considered the
possibility of presenting the opening offer in plea negotiations-even though it is wellunderstood by students of dispute resolution that the opening offer tends to exert
considerable influence over all subsequent negotiation. See, e.g., MAX H. BAZERMAN &
MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 29 (1992) (discussing anchoring
effects).
2. See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptionsof Fairness in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV.
753 (2004).
3. See, e.g., Douglas H. Yarn & Gregory Todd Jones, In Our Bones (or Brains):
*

**
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their part, scholars of dispute resolution may benefit from the focused
attention criminal law scholars have given to the culture of the
courthouse,4 the influence of sentencing guidelines on settlement,5 and
lawyer-client agency problems.6
Although we believe that criminal law and dispute resolution
scholars have much to learn from one another, plea bargaining is
undoubtedly a unique form of dispute resolution, and any attempt to
apply the generic lessons of negotiation theory to criminal law must be
undertaken with great care. Indeed, one may object even to our
premise that plea bargaining can appropriately be labeled a form of
dispute resolution-a term that calls to mind the allocation of limited
material resources between two parties of roughly equal legal and moral
status. By contrast, it might be said that plea bargaining is a transaction
between very different sorts of parties (the state and the citizen), and
one whose ultimate goal is the moral condemnation of one by the other.
Viewed this way, there seems a fundamental asymmetry between the
status, power, and objectives of the two sides that differentiates plea
bargaining in profound ways from other sorts of negotiation more
commonly studied by dispute resolution scholars.7
Yet, this picture does not fully convey what plea bargaining is or
should be. Characterizing one side in plea bargaining as the state bent
on moral condemnation misses the important and complex role played
by the prosecutor, nominally as representative of the state, but in
practice (given agency problems and the broad discretion traditionally
enjoyed by American prosecutors) doubtlessly self-serving to a not
inconsiderable extent. Moreover, the increasingly robust role played by
victims in the criminal justice system further undermines the practical
significance of the state-versus-citizen structure of criminal disputes and
adds a new dimension to the agency problems." At the extreme, when
Behavioral Biology, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK 283 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider &
Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006).
4. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participationin Criminal Procedure,81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911,920-23 (2006).
5. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea BargainingOutside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463, 2486-91 (2004).
6. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84
YALE L.J. 1179, 1180 (1975).
7. This probably explains why dispute resolution scholars, with some prominent
exceptions, have not written about plea bargaining. See, e.g., Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss
Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 205; Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to
"Guilty": Plea Bargainingas Negotiation, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115 (1997).
8. We learned recently of one district attorney's office that expressly instructs its law
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prosecutors find themselves negotiating with defendants over restitution
for victims, there seems little to differentiate plea bargaining from
conventional civil dispute resolution. And, even short of that extreme,
plea bargaining discussions may focus on a variety of considerations that
relate only obliquely to moral condemnation: the place where the
sentence will be served; the conditions imposed for probation or
supervised release; the defendant's ability and willingness to testify
against other offenders; the precise package of procedural rights to be
waived by the defendant (e.g., whether the right to appeal the sentence
will be waived); the factual basis of the plea; the collateral consequences
that will be triggered by the guilty plea (e.g., sex offender registration);
fines; forfeiture; the release of civil claims; and so forth. Plea bargaining
is not primarily about each side's efforts to maximize financial returns,
nor is it exclusively an exercise in moral judgment. The parties, rather,
may have a rich variety of ends in mind, some of which inevitably must
be traded off against one another-a dynamic not so fundamentally
different from what one finds in the negotiated resolution of civil
disputes.
Nor, from a normative standpoint, do we find the pure moral
condemnation model an entirely appealing account of the criminal
justice system. Some of the most successful recent innovations in
criminal procedure (for instance, restorative justice programs and
therapeutic courts) speak to a deeply felt need for more pragmatic,
problem-solving responses to criminal offenses.9 Indeed, thoughtful
prosecutors have long recognized this need and sought through plea
bargaining not only to hold offenders accountable for their misdeeds,
but also to address the needs of victims more broadly and to establish a
framework for the offender's successful reintegration into the
community. Such problem-solving approaches are to be encouraged as
a more constructive response to crime than the "get-tough" ethos of the
1980s and 1990s, which produced a shameful and unprecedented
explosion in American prison populations.'0 To the extent that plea
student interns that they should regard victims as their clients.
9. See, e.g., Mark S. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the Twenty-First Century: A
Social Movement Full of Opportunities and Pitfalls, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 254-63 (2005)
(describing premises and growing importance of restorative justice programs).
10. See Michael M. O'Hear, Is Restorative Justice Compatible with Sentencing
Uniformity?, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 305, 305-06 (2005). Professor James Whitman has described
subtle and important connections between the growth of prison populations and an emphasis
on moral condemnation as the overriding purpose of the criminal justice system. See, e.g.,
James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 89-90, 106-07
(2003).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[91:1

bargaining moves increasingly in the problem-solving direction, it will
(and should) look increasingly like court-connected alternative dispute
resolution processes in the civil arena. Although criminal dispute
resolution will always retain distinctive characteristics, thoughtful and
constructive plea bargaining should function in ways that make
continued dialogue between criminal law and dispute resolution scholars
a mutually beneficial enterprise.

The Conference was comprised of three panels and a roundtable
discussion of practitioners.
The first panel dealt with the classic
observation in the dispute resolution literature, that negotiation occurs
in the shadow of the law. Put differently, the concept is that negotiated
outcomes are shaped, to a greater or lesser extent, by what the parties
expect would happen if the case went to trial." To what extent, though,
does this hold in the criminal law field? In their paper, Professors
Ronald Wright and Rodney Engen explore the relationship between
criminal code structure, particularly, the number and nature of charging
options available for different types of crimes, and the outcomes of plea
bargaining.' 2
Their work offers an important caveat to recent
scholarship that has tended to downplay the significance of formal law
in plea bargaining. 3 Professor Richard Birke's article 4 builds on his
earlier pathbreaking work that first recognized the contradiction
between theories based on cognitive psychology about when parties
should "rationally" settle and the reality of what was actually occurring
in plea bargaining.
He argues in his new article that doctrines and
practices that make trials readily available in criminal litigation play a
greatly underappreciated role in promoting cooperative behavior
between prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers and suggests that

11. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law, 88
YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
12. Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, Charge Movement and Theories of
Prosecutors,91 MARQ. L. REV. 9 (2007). They expand here on their innovative earlier work
on this subject. See Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance
in a Criminal Code on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1935
(2006).
13. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 5.
14. Richard Birke, The Role of Trial in Promoting Cooperative Negotiation in Criminal
Practice, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 39 (2007).
15. Birke, supra note 7.
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increasing the availability of trials on the civil side may have similar
salutary effects. Professor Andrea Schneider's article also focuses on
how the negotiation practices of criminal lawyers differ from that of
their civil counterparts. 6 Based on data from her earlier study of lawyer
negotiation styles,' 7 Schneider reveals that criminal lawyers, especially
on the defense side, are remarkably problem-solving. She questions
whether this tendency is a result of long-term relationships and shared
goals in justice-promoting, efficient settlements, or a result of
overwhelmed attorneys representing uneducated and poor defendants
with few options. In his article, Professor Josh Bowers identifies
another source of the "shadows" in which plea bargaining takes place:
community views of police practices.' Based on the experience of New
York City with order maintenance-policing in the 1990s, he describes
how and why prosecutors may reduce going plea rates in order to
enhance community acquiescence to controversial law enforcement
policies. Finally, in his contribution, framed as a response to Professors
Wright, Engen, Birke, and Bowers. Professor Daniel Barnhizer draws
helpful comparisons between plea bargaining and consumer contracts.' 9
In the power imbalance between prosecutors and defendants, Barnhizer
sees a reflection of the power imbalances between producers and
consumers, resulting in the equivalent of standard form contracts that
leave defendants with limited options and prosecutors with the ability to
harvest information that can be used to gain leverage in future plea
bargaining interactions.
The second panel addressed what the field of psychology has to
teach us about plea bargaining. In classic economic models of plea
bargaining, all of the participants are so-called "rational utilitymaximizers" who pursue consistent objectives in a neatly predictable
fashion. Psychology research, which is increasingly being drawn on by
legal scholars of all stripes, gives us a much more complicated picture of
human thinking and behavior. In her article, Professor Rebecca
Hollander-Blumoff explains why the current understanding of how the
rational actor model paradigm does not capture the reality of plea

16. Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Cooperatingor Caving in: Are Defense Attorneys Shrewd
or Exploited in Plea BargainingNegotiations? 91 MARQ. L. REV. 145 (2007).
17. Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the
Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143 (2002).
18. Josh Bowers, GrassrootsPlea Bargaining,91 MARQ. L. REV. 85 (2007).
19. Daniel D. Barnhizer, Bargaining Power in the Shadow of the Law, 91 MARQ. L.
REV. 123 (2007).
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bargaining. 0 Moreover, notwithstanding what is assumed about their
role in other negotiations, lawyers do not actually lessen the effect of
cognitive biases and heuristics in plea bargaining. As HollanderBlumoff explains, a broader social psychological approach is needed to
understand the motivations of the individuals engaged in plea
bargaining. In her contribution, Professor Alafair Burke focuses on
how individuals rather than systematic pressures can affect plea
bargaining.:' Particularly, she argues that the prosecutor's passion for a
case influences the prosecutor's willingness to bargain. This passion can
also serve to strengthen the cognitive biases and heuristics described by
Hollander-Blumoff. Professor Russell Covey's article starts with the
question of why plea bargains are so common given the existence of
plea-discouraging cognitive biases. He argues that the structure and
features of the criminal justice system are, in fact, often designed to
counteract what would otherwise be strong tendencies to go to trial.
Professor Chad Oldfather introduces a note of caution regarding the
applicability of behavioral economics to the behavior of criminal
defendants. 3 He suggests that both the psychological atypicality of
criminal defendants and the unique context of the criminal justice
system ought to give us pause before assuming that defendants will act
in the manner predicted by research involving a broader slice of the
population making different sorts of decisions under different
constraints.
The third panel considered the role of victims, apology, and
restorative justice in plea bargaining. Professor Erik Luna's article
Although plea
offers a libertarian critique of plea bargaining.24
bargaining might seem attractive to libertarians as a seemingly marketbased means of resolving criminal cases, Luna points out that this
superficial view neglects victims; as the individuals whose rights have
been violated by the. offender, victims should play a central role in case
resolution. In Luna's view, prosecutor-dominated plea bargaining

20. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Psychology, Information Processing, and Plea
Bargaining,91 MARO. L. REV. 163 (2007).
21. Alafair S. Burke, ProsecutorialPassion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 183 (2007).
22. Russell Covey, Reconsidering the Relationship Between Cognitive Psychology and
Plea Bargaining,91 MARQ. L. REV. 213 (2007).
23. Chad M. Oldfather, Heuristics, Biases, and Criminal Defendants, 91 MARQ. L. REV.
249 (2007).
24. Erik Luna, Traces of a Libertarian Theory of Punishment, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 263

(2007).
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should thus be replaced by restorative justice practices that more fully
empower victims. In their article, Professors Margareth Etienne and
Jennifer Robbennolt describe the potential benefits to victims of
offender apologies,- which might be one of the chief advantages of the
As Etienne and
sort of restorative processes favored by Luna.
Robbennolt demonstrate, however, the marginalized position of victims
and offenders in the existing criminal litigation framework substantially
diminishes the likelihood that apology can be integrated effectively into
plea bargaining processes. In his article, Professor Michael O'Hear
discusses the potential benefits of victim participation in plea bargaining
and proposes a new model for victim participation structured around
transparent charging and bargaining guidelines for prosecutors.2 6
Finally, Professor Douglas Beloof briefly responds to O'Hear's
proposal, finding it a novel and promising approach to the problem of
better integrating victims into the criminal justice system without losing
sight of the system's public-regarding objectives.27
In addition to panels, the Conference included a roundtable
discussion of plea bargaining in Wisconsin, the transcript of which is
included in this issue of the Marquette Law Review.s The discussion
included several of the state's most respected criminal justice leaders
and practitioners. Plea bargaining is a notoriously opaque practice to
Our scholarly conversation on plea bargaining thus
outsiders.
benefitted considerably from some well-informed insider perspectives.
Of course, more systematic empirical research, both qualitative and
quantitative, remains one of the most pressing needs in the plea
bargaining field.

We would like to thank all of our authors and other participants for
a lively and productive conversation about plea bargaining, first in
person and now in print. We are also grateful to Marquette Law
School's Dean, Joseph Kearney, for his generous support and
25. Margareth Etienne & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Plea Bargaining,91
MARQ. L. REV. 295 (2007).
26. Michael M. O'Hear, Victims and Plea Bargaining:From Consultation to Guidelines,
91 MARQ. L. REV. 323 (2007).
27. Douglas E. Beloof, Dignity, Equality, and Public Interestfor Defendants and Crime
Victims in Plea Bargains,91 MARQ. L. REV. 349 (2007).
28. Plea Bargaining from the Criminal Lawyer's Perspective: Plea Bargaining in
Wisconsin, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 357 (2007).

8
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encouragement, and to the many other administrators and staff
members at Marquette who helped to make the Conference a success.
Finally, we would like to thank the editors of the Marquette Law Review
for their hard work in bringing the Conference papers into print.

